Sample Essay: Max Weber’s Theory

Max Weber (1864-1920) does not figure in the history of anthropology in the way Durkheim, Freud, or even Marx do because Weber made next to no use of ethnographic (or proto-ethnographic) materials in his work—indeed, few histories of anthropology make any mention of Weber.' Weber was trained in economic history, and his very large corpus of work is centrally concemed with historical processes in the great civilizations of the world. His historical sociology has, however, considerable relevance to an anthropology that has become increasingly historically oriented. David Gellner (2001, p. 1), in his introduction to The Anthropology of Buddhism and Hinduism: Weberian Themes, writes, "The conjunction of 'Weber and anthropology' is sufficiently unusual to warrant justification." In this essay I seek both to offer such a justification and to show that whereas there may not be "Weberian anthropology," much anthropological work has been influenced directly or indirectly by the work of Max Weber. Moreover, there are good reasons, I believe, for rethinking Weber's work in light of contemporary anthropological concems. This article is about the influence of the work of Max Weber on English-speaking anthropologists. No effort is made here to assess the broader influence of Weber on the social sciences, especially in sociology and political science, where Weber has been and continues to be read more than in anthropology. I also consider only the English translations of Weber's work.


Weber's Sociology Of Religion And The Anthropological Study Of Religion
Weber's interpretive method is predicated on an assumption that is also fundamental to his theoretical approach. In a passage on "Religious Groups" in Economy and Society Weber posited that "the human mind... is driven to refiect on ethical and religious questions, driven not by material need but by an inner compulsion to understand the world as a meaningful cosmos and to take up a position toward it" (Weber 1963, pp. 116-117, emphasis added). Whereas much of the meaning that makes possible acting in the world derives from what Weber termed "tradition" (perhaps better formulated in terms of Bourdieu's habitus), there are experiences that render problematic conventional meaning. Parsons, refiecting on such "problems of meaning," observed that Weber postulates a basic 'drive' towards meaning and the resolution of these discrepancies on the level of meaning, a drive or tendency which is often held in check by various defensive mechanisms, of which the pre-eminent one here relevant is that of magic. But whatever the situation regarding the effectiveness of this drive, there is a crucial point conceming the direction in which this tendency propels the development of culture. This is that the search for grounds of meaning which can resolve the discrepancies must lead to continually more 'ultimate' reference points which are progressively further removed from the levels of common sense experience on which the discrepancies originally arise.

The 'explanations,' i.e., solutions to the problems of meaning, must be grounded in increasingly generalized and 'fundamental' philosophical conceptions. (Parsons in Weber 1963, pp. xlvii-xlviii). "Ultimate" meaning can never be attained through refiection and rationalization; rather, it can come only, Weber argued, through the nonrational acceptance of the dogmatic propositions embedded in the salvation ethic of a religion. Salvation the absolute certainty that the cosmos is ultimately meaningful—is more psychological than cogtiitive. "The quest of certitudo salutis itself has... been the origin of all psychological drives of a purely religious character" (Weber 1958a, p. 228). Geertz's (1966; 1973, pp. 87-125) "Religion as a Cultural System" starts with and elaborates on this Weberian position. Asad (1983; 1993, pp. 27-54) has strongly criticized Geertz's approach, and although this was not his intent, his criticism points to some important differences between Geertz and Weber. "(1) First, Asad (1993, pp. 30) points to Geertz's (1973, pp. 92) definition of religion as a "system of symbols" as entailing a confusion between symbols as an "aspect of social reality" (what I would term, following Weber, an aspect of social action) and symbols as representations of social reality. Weber, like Asad, saw meaning as embedded in social action, in Asad's (1993, pp. 32) words, being "intrinsically and not temporally connected."

Asad (1993, pp. 28) further criticized Geertz for adopting a modem post- Enlightenment Westem view of religion as having an autonomous essence separate from politics. Although this criticism might not be sustainable if one were to take into account Geertz's ethnographic work on Islam in Indonesia and Morocco, the point I want to make here is that Weber certainly would not make such a distinction. In "Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions," for example, he wrote. The widely varying empirical stands which historical religions have taken in the face of political action have been determined by the entanglement of religious organizations in power interests and the stmggles for power, by the almost unavoidable collapse of even the highest states of tension with the world in favor of compromises and relativities, by the usefulness and the use of religious organizations for the political taming of the masses and, especially, by the need of the powers-that-be for the religious consecration of their legitimacy. (Weber 1958b, pp. 337-38) Weber maintained that from time to time in all societies in which religions with rationalized salvation ethics have evolved tensions develop between religious and political institutions: Every religiously grounded unworldly love and indeed every ethical religion must, in similar measure and for similar reasons, experience tensions with the sphere of political behavior. This tension appears as soon as a religion has progressed to anything like a status of equality with the sphere of political associations. (Weber 1963, p. 223)
I disagree with Asad's criticism of Geertz's predication of religion on the experience people encounter with fundamental problems of meaning. Geertz, who in this respect is very much following Weber, formulates these problems as ones in which "chaos—a tumult of events which lack not just interpretations by interpretability—threatens to break upon man: at the limits of his analytical capacities, at the limits of his power of endurance, and at the limits of his moral insight. Bafflement, suffering, and a sense of intractable ethical paradox are all, if they become intense enough or are sustained long enough, radical challenges to the proposition that life is comprehensible and that we can, by taking thought, orient ourselves within it—challenges which any religion . . . which hopes to persist must attempt somehow to cope" (Geertz 1973, p. 100, emphasis in original). Geertz (1973, pp. 109-10) went on to argue that the experiences of fundamental problems of meaning "drives" people toward "belief" in particular formulations of ultimate meaning that constitute what he calls a "religious perspective." Asad ignored, in his critique of Geertz's discussion of the religious perspective, the central point that "religious belief involves... a prior acceptance of authority which transforms" the experiences of problems of meaning (Geertz 1973, p. 109). Asad's failure to recognize or unwillingness to accept that problems of meaning, albeit always in particular manifestations, are universal led him to the untenable conclusion that religion, except in "the most vacuous sense," is not "basic to the structure of modem lives" (Asad 1993, p. 49)."(2)

One wonders how he would approach a study, to take only two presumably very modem societies, of the significance in America of the religious right in politics, the moral debate over abortion, or the proliferation of New Age religions or in Japan of the debate over the visit of a prime minister to a Shinto shrine, the attack on the Tokyo subway of a movement identified as a cult, or the moral debates over the use of organs of deceased persons, and so on. There is now a growing hterature that demonstrates well the persistence, resurgence, and transformation of religions in modem societies owing to the fact that although "science and technology, together are basic to the structure of modem lives" (Asad 1993, p. 49, emphasis in original), problems of meaning continue to impel people in modem societies towards religion.'(3) "My aim," Asad (1993, p. 54) wrote in the conclusion to his essay, "has been to problematize the idea of an anthropological definition of religion by assigning that endeavor to a particular history of knowledge and power... out of which the modem world has been constructed." This statement could very easily be used to characterize Weber's Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion.  Weber sought in this collection to undertake a comparative sociology of the relationship between the major salvation religions of the world (Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Chinese religion, and Islam), the political economies of the societies in which large majorities of the populations found the soteriological practices of these religions compelling. Weber was always concemed with the distinctive "developmental history" of each of these religious traditions rather than trying to fit them into a procnistean mold of some essentialized religion.

Notes:
(1) Although Asad shows some familiarity with Weber, he does not draw on him to any significant extent. What is striking, however, is that Asad seeks to push anthropological work in the same direction as Weber In his introduction to Genealogies of Religion he wrote, "I am concemed with how systemacity (including the kind that is essential to what is called capitalism) is apprehended, represented, and used in the contemporary world" (Asad 1993, pp. 7) and "Modem capitalist enterprises and modemizing nation-states are the two most important powers that organize spaces today..." (Asad 1993, p. 8).
(2) It might seem curious that Asad should, thus, have contributed a most insightful essay on torture to a book entitled Social Suffering that is clearly concemed with exploring crossculturally what Geertz termed the "the sense of intractable ethical paradox" (Asad 1997).
(3) I cannot survey all the relevant literature on this subject but point to only two works that both take up the theme of problems of meaning in modem societies: Keyes et al. (1994) and Kleinman et al. (1997).

Reference:

Ferguson, Niall. Economic Affairs, Dec2004, Vol. 24 Issue 4, p37-40, 4p;

Patterson, Eric. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Sep2004, Vol. 43 Issue 3, p345-362, 18p, 8 charts

Sharot, Stephen. Sociology of Religion, Winter2002, Vol. 63 Issue 4, p427-454, 28p

Keyes, Charles F.. Annual Review of Anthropology, 2002, Vol. 31 Issue 1, p233-255, 23p

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Swartz, David. Sociology of Religion, Spring96, Vol. 57 Issue 1, p71, 15p

Adriance, Madeleine. Sociology of Religion, Summer94, Vol. 55 Issue 2, p163, 16p

Research Paper: Britain Employment Law

Is discrimination based on religion or on race and ethnicity?
Religions with large numbers of visible minorities, such as Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus, reported the most discrimination overall and research participants who belonged to these minority groups often identified a degree of overlap between religious and racial discrimination. Implicit or explicit references to racism were also common during the local interviews. Amongst Christians, black-led organisations were consistently more likely to say that their members experienced unfair treatment than Christian organisations generally. Many interviewees pointed to the artificiality of trying to separate religious and cultural identities. However, there were also claims of unfair treatment from white people of British descent with no outward, visible signs of their religion. This suggests that such treatment can be a response to the nature of someone’s beliefs and practices (for example, the hostility that is sometimes expressed towards groups that are often referred to as ‘cults’). In other cases it may be the strength of belief and its effect on behaviour (“the more active you are, the more vulnerable you become”) or the degree to which people seek to convert others. A number of interviewees pointed out that whilst there are those who see religion as an intrinsic or important part of their identity, the rest of society tends to think of religion as optional and may therefore assume that religious requirements can be negotiated.
Interviewees provided instances in which the rigid dividing line between religion and culture that is sometimes imposed by outsiders can prove awkward and divisive. For example, religious groups may have to present themselves as cultural groups in order to obtain local authority funding for the community services they provide. They feel uncomfortable about doing this, and people from religious organisations that are not associated with cultural minorities may feel discriminated against because they are unable to present themselves in this way.
What are the policy options?
Participants in the research favoured a comprehensive approach in which education, training, and a bigger effort to teach more about comparative religion in schools would all play an important part. This was in line with their repeatedly expressed views about the role of ignorance in fostering religious discrimination by individuals and by organisations in both the public and private sectors, and also with the view expressed in interviews that the media reinforce such ignorance and prejudicial attitudes. There was scepticism about voluntary codes of practice because these often prove ineffective. Research participants recognised that the law has both strengths and limitations and did not think it would suffice on its own. However, some changes in the law might be needed in order to “send the right messages about discrimination”. These could help if used judiciously and in conjunction with other approaches. The idea of legislation of some kind received most support from Muslim organisations and interviewees from ethnic minority groups.
In the local interviews, it was pointed out that the changes needed from employers and service providers were not necessarily expensive: quite small adaptations could be very helpful and sometimes it was as simple as trying to ensure that people were not made to feel awkward. There was a role for better guidelines and ‘worked examples’. It was felt that employers and educationalists, in particular, could do more to accommodate religious diversity, and in a less grudging way. In areas such as planning and funding, more ‘mainstreaming’ was required and greater acknowledgement of the services that religious organisations provide to their own – and sometimes to the wider – community. Those from the less well known and the less ‘mainstream’ religions stressed the need for more inclusiveness – for example when holding events or carrying out consultation exercises.
Background
In recent years, individuals and organisations from a variety of religious traditions have begun to argue that discrimination exists on grounds of religion and that it deserves to be taken as seriously as discrimination on other grounds. Until now, however, there has been little research into the nature and extent of religious discrimination in this country. Some claims of unfair treatment have been made by groups who are also likely to suffer discrimination on grounds of race or ethnicity, making it difficult (perhaps unrealistic) to disentangle one form of discrimination from another. On the other hand, some of those claiming religious discrimination do not belong to an ethnic or racial minority, or they quote examples (eg Islamophobia1 in the media) which do appear to be targeted more at religious belief and practice than at membership of an ethnic group or cultural tradition. The relative absence of law and policy that specifically recognises the possibility of religious discrimination has meant that people wanting to make formal claims of discrimination have had to rely where they can on other grounds (usually race or gender) even though they may feel that religion is the real basis of their claim. This report describes the results of the primary research undertaken by this project. It provides a resource for government, for communities, and for organisations of various kinds in assessing the evidence about religious discrimination.
Objectives
In commissioning the research in April 1999, the Home Office set the following objectives:
1. To assess the evidence of religious discrimination in England and Wales, both
2. To describe the patterns shown by this evidence, including:
• its overall scale
• the main victims
• the main perpetrators
• the main ways in which the discrimination manifests
3. To indicate the extent to which religious discrimination overlaps with racial discrimination.
4. To identify the broad range of policy options available for dealing with religious discrimination.
The final objective could include legislative options as well as other measures such as policy reviews, voluntary codes of practice, or training and education programmes. However, the legal context has been much changed since the inception of the research project by the incorporation into British law of the Human Rights Act and the Treaty of Amsterdam, and is likely to change further as case law develops. The Home Office has therefore commissioned a separate report which looks at the legal options in more detail2. The present report simply indicates the extent to which research participants thought some form of legislative change might be useful. Although the research concentrated on the views and experiences of people who identify themselves with a religion, this is not to ignore the possibility that secularists, humanists and agnostics may also experience discrimination on the basis of religion. Such experience also needs to be taken into account in framing policy in this area.
The Case Study
The media spotlight has recently focused on the issue of religious discrimination in the workplace. The education environment has been particularly under its glare following the suspension of the school teacher Aishah Azmi, and her subsequent tribunal claim. Ms Azmi, a teaching assistant in a West Yorkshire school, was asked to remove her niqab, a face veil worn by some Muslim women that leaves only the eyes visible, because pupils found it hard to understand her during English language lessons. The tribunal found that suspension of Ms Azmi did not amount to discrimination on religious grounds, although she was awarded £1,000 for victimisation because the school had not followed grievance procedures correctly.
OTHER HIGH-PROFILE CASES
There have been other, similar high-profile cases in the news recently. These include that of Shabnam Mughal, a legal executive who was asked to remove her niqab by a judge at an immigration tribunal in Stoke on Trent, because he could not hear what she was saying properly. Ms Mughal refused and her firm handed conduct of the case over to another advocate. Nadia Eweida, a British Airways ground crew member, sued her employer for religious discrimination after being told that she could not wear a crucifix unless she concealed it beneath her uniform. She lost her appeal. Whilst the law on religious discrimination is not new, having been introduced in 2003, the glut of recent cases has put the issue at the front of employers’ minds. For background and more detail on the law, see Education Law Update issues 36 and 62 (for back issues call 0845 450 6404).
DEALING WITH RELIGIOUS REQUESTS
Navigating the minefield that is workplace discrimination is difficult at the best of times, particularly where contentious and sensitive issues like religion are involved. So what should employers do when faced with requests for allowances to be made at work on religious grounds? This article will outline the legal background to religious discrimination law, and look at how to balance pupil and staff needs.
THE LAW
The law on religious discrimination is contained in the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003. These regulations prohibit discrimination on the grounds of a person’s religion or belief in the following forms: Direct discrimination: where an employer treats a candidate or employee less favourably than it would treat others, on the grounds of religion or belief. Indirect discrimination: where an employer applies a provision, criterion or practice equally to all staff, but this puts, or would put, a particular religious group at a specific disadvantage when compared to others. Such rules do not constitute indirect discrimination if the employer can show that they are a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. Victimisation: where a current, prospective or former employee is treated less favourably than others in the workplace on the grounds that s/he has carried out a ‘protected act’.
Protected acts include:
o Bringing proceedings against the employer under the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003
o Giving evidence in connection with such proceedings
o Alleging that the employer, either directly or vicariously through one of its employees, has committed an act that would amount to a contravention of these regulations

For victimisation to be established, it is not necessary for the complainant to have carried out a protected act. It is sufficient to establish that the employer suspected s/he did, or intended to do, any such act. Harassment: where an employer, either on its own behalf or through the actions of an employee, engages in unwanted conduct that violates an individual’s dignity or creates an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for that person.
IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYER
So what does this all mean for the employer? Do employees have the right to express their religion and belief in any way they wish within the working environment? Thankfully for employers, no. A candidate or employee does have the clear right not to be discriminated against in the workplace. It does not take a legal expert to realise that an employee teased about wearing a turban at work is the subject of harassment, or that denying promotion opportunities because a staff member is of a different religion would be direct discrimination. But often, the potential for discrimination is much more subtle, and it is indirect discrimination that causes most of the problems within the workplace. Recently publicised cases involving the rejection of specific dress requirements are all about indirect discrimination. In each case, the employee’s argument has been that the employer has applied a provision, criterion or practice, i.e. a prohibition of certain items of clothing or jewellery that puts employees of a particular religion at a disadvantage when compared with others.
THE CASE OF THE VEIL
In the case of the Muslim classroom assistant, the practice applied was that employees responsible for teaching classes could not wear items of clothing that covered the employee’s face. This puts Muslim employees at a disadvantage when compared with other workforce groups, as it prevents them from wearing the niqab, which some Muslims believe is a religious requirement. At first sight, this appears to be discriminatory. But the law allows employers to defend an indirect discrimination claim by proving that the provision, criterion or practice in question amounts to a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
What is ‘a legitimate aim’
This is the crux of the issue. The school’s aim must be to give the children the best possible education, and any barriers to that aim should be removed. Ms Azmi’s school clearly believed that the niqab was a bar to that aim. The question is, then, whether the insistence on its removal was a proportionate means of achieving that aim. The tribunal in this case held that it was.
Proportionality
Of course, it is not only the wearing of religious dress or jewellery that can cause problems for employers. The regulations affect many other everyday workplace issues, such as requests for time off for religious holidays, and dietary requirements dictated by a person’s religion. The key in all of these situations is for an employer who receives such a request to consider carefully what aim it is trying to achieve, and whether the rejection of a request is a proportionate means of achieving that aim. Where the employer has given genuine consideration to a request, balanced the employee’s needs against organisational requirements, and considered any possible compromises, the company should be in a position to defend any claim in the event it has to reject the request.
RECRUITMENT POLICY
The other issue for the education sector is whether employers can enforce a policy of recruiting teachers only from a particular faith and rejecting candidates from other religious backgrounds. Provision is specifically made for this in the recently amended Education and Inspections Bill, as already mentioned. On the face of it, this appears to allow discrimination on religious grounds but this is not necessarily so.
‘Genuine occupational requirement’
The regulations do provide a specific defence to claims of direct discrimination in circumstances where being of a particular religion or belief is a ‘genuine and determining’ occupational requirement for the job. To rely on this defence, an employer must be able to establish that the alleged occupational requirement is proportionate in the particular case. Example: A recognised Church of England school may be able to insist that all of its teachers are practising Christians, thereby rejecting applications from candidates of any other religion. If challenged, the school would have to establish that one of the aims of the school was to actively promote the Christian religion amongst its pupils — and that this aim could only be achieved by employing practising Christians to teach in the school.
‘Genuine’ and ‘determining’
The occupational requirement must be genuine and determining, and be proportionate in the case in question. It will be necessary to consider the requirements of the job very closely. Religious discrimination is only likely to be lawful in cases of those involved in religious services, whose job involves teaching or promoting religion. Jobs that are ancillary to the religion are unlikely to be covered. The defence would not succeed, for example, in a claim by a Christian rejected for a secretarial post in a Muslim school. There is probably no occupational requirement for secretarial staff, cleaners or other support staff not responsible for the teaching or welfare of pupils to be of a particular religion.
The ‘specific’ or ‘religious organisations’ defence
There is a further defence against discrimination claims based on the occupational requirement for the job. This is known as the ‘specific’ or ‘religious organisations’ genuine occupation requirement defence. It applies where: an employer has an ethos based on religion or belief, and having regard to that ethos and the nature of the employment or the context in which it is carried out, being of a particular religion or belief is a genuine occupational requirement for the job. This would apply to spiritual posts in churches, mosques, synagogues and temples but it is unclear whether it would extend as far as a Roman Catholic nursing home, Halal butchers or Christian youth groups. As with the general defence, in order to rely on it, an employer would have to establish that it was proportionate to apply the occupational requirement in a particular case. This is likely to involve dealing with the potential adverse impacts of employing a person of a different religion and the damage this could have to the religious ethos or the organisation. The religious organisations genuine occupational requirement is broader, in that being of a particular religion or belief only has to be a requirement, not a determining requirement (i.e. decisive) as with the general GOR. This will make it easier for religious organisations to discriminate on the grounds of religion.
Legislation
A wide variety of views were expressed about the potential benefits or otherwise of law in tackling unfair treatment on the basis of religion in employment specifically. A white male, advice manager recalled that:…with age discrimination, we had a voluntary code. All studies show it’s not working. You’ll always have good employers who have the foresight of the advantages of overcoming stereotypes, who have imagination. A white, female, policy manager felt that “the lack of mainstream religious equality is a national problem” and that equal opportunities policies at the local level can offer a more comprehensive approach than the currently quite narrow framework offered by the Race
Relations Act:
It is probably time for the Race Relations Act be revised. It should include religion because it’s so intertwined. A professional stated that the successful implementation of the Disability Discrimination Act had been hindered by the absence of enforcement measures. This same interviewee expressed the view that unfair treatment on the basis of religion could be addressed through legislation, but also that employers were in particular need of being able to see, and to draw upon, examples of good practice from elsewhere:…you need to have champions who say “we’re doing it!” along with good practice guidelines and demands from the top. You need reporting, bench-marking data, peer group pressure – it shouldn’t require a lot of investment; often people are apt to say that they’d need too much money to do it... One male, Asian, advice professional commented on the way in which legislation can serve to empower people to stand up for their own rights. For example, although the Sex
Discrimination Act was thought to need further refinement:
Now you expect women to stand up. You don’t need a policy to say what the policy should say. They are aware of their rights. An employer might not have a policy statement on maternity leave, but if an employee is pregnant, you go find out what their needs are, and what needs to happen....Having a bank of documents is not enough or
necessary. A white, female, business development specialist observed that: You need worked examples for employers to draw on, especially if regulation is involved. Good practice examples are important, especially because they’re more comprehensible – and are especially germane as they tell start up companies to emulate and evaluate the good practices of their competitors, which is a good way to pass it along as part of good business.

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